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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OLIVE M. WOODARD, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. i 
KARL WCCDAPP, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
Case No. D-79-1766 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 73-2(a)-{3;, [2) \g), as 
this is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
involving domestic relations, specifically, a divorce and 
property settlement. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Bench Trial for the determination 
of a property division in divorce proceedings, subject to an 
Order of the Court setting aside the previous division of 
property of the previous Order regarding division of property in 
a prior divorce proceeding. As the parties are an older couple 
and a Decree of Divorce was entered on February 23, 1982, in 
which Order, the property division provisions were set aside. 
The only issue before the Court relates to the property division. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the Court's division of the marital assets 
inequitable? 
2. Did the Court err in providing that Defendant receive 
his share of the property, only upon the death of Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF DETEFMINATIVE STATUTES 
This appeal is from an Order in a Divorce proceeding 
dividing the marital assets which is determined by U.C.A. Section 
30-3-5-1, to wit: 
"(l)When a decree of divorce is rendered the court tiay 
include in it equitable orders relating to children, 
property and parties . . . . " 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on August 1, 1933. 
(Findings, 1982, p. 2.) 
2. A Decree of Divorce was entered on February 23, 1932, 
and the provisions regarding property awarded Plaintiff's 
interest in two (2) payments on a contract involving Fenton 
Avenue Properties, and a one-half (1/2) interest in the amounts 
to be received from the Stratler Contract after a certain amount 
for temporary spousal support was paid from those payments, and 
to Defendant, awarded Defendant the Fruitland properties and the 
remaining one-half (1/2) of the Stratler Avenue Properties 
Contract. (Decree of Divorce, 1982.) 
3. On May 25, 1984, the Court set aside said property 
division based on the fact that Plaintifffs interest in the 
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contract was lost in the Bankruptcy Court. (Transcript, p. 247.) 
4. Neither of the parties did nothing to save property in 
bankruptcy or tc protect the interest. (Transcript, p. 73.) 
5. Defendant was burned February 23, 1971, and received a 
personal injury award in the net amount of $64,CCC.OO, in 
approximately 1972, of which he used some of the funds to 
» 
purchase the Fruitland property for a cost of $24,000.0C. 
(Transcript, p. 81-84.) 
6. Defendant acquired the Gregson property and the 3ryan 
mortgages and with very, if any, equity interest in each of the 
properties at that time. (Transcript, p. 119-120.) 
7. At about the same time, Defendant acquired title to 
Ciaybourne property, subject to an existing mortgage, with little 
or no equity in said property. During the period of time 
Defendant has had title to the Gregscn, Bryan Avenue and 
Ciaybourne properties, he has made various improvements to said 
properties. (Transcript, pp. 158-163.) 
8. The Ciaybourne property was subsequently sold and their 
remains a contractual interest in said property in the amount of 
approximately $20,000.00. 
9. There exists unrecorded lien claims by one, Norma 
Evans, wife of Robert Evans, deceased, against the properties of 
Ciaybourne, Bryan Avenue and Gregson. (Transcript, p. 179.) 
10. Both parties are currently living under the poverty 
level. (Transcript, p. 222.) 
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11. Plaintiff receives the sum of $193.00 per month Social* 
Security, and $155.00 per month SSI, for a total amount of 
$353.00 per month. (Transcript, p. 196-197.) 
12. Defendant receives Social Security in the amount of 
approximately $605.00 per month. (Transcript, p. 144.) 
13. Defendant has need of further medical surgery on his 
eyes to correct vision problems associated with his burn 
accident. (Transcript, p. 230.) 
14. The monies due under the Stratler contract are on file 
with the Clerk's office, and placed in an interest bearing 
account in the sum of approximately $20,667.96. (Transcript, p. 
1S3. ) 
15. On a Bench Decision, the Court gave Plaintiff the 
authority to liquidate the Gregscn, Bryan Avenue and Claybourne 
properties, less reasonable, demonstrable claims, the net 
proceeds to be placed in an account with the Stratler property 
monies already on file with the Clerk's office, to be held for a 
monthly distribution to Plaintiff in the amount of $205.00, plus 
any replacement of Supplemental Security Income, if . said 
supplemental income was lost due to this Order. The balance to 
be held intact, and not otherwise reimbursed without further 
order of the Court. (Transcript, p. 252-255.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Courtfs division of the martial assets was 
inequitable because the Court failed to take into consideration, 
Defendant's continued pain and suffering and need for further 
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medical attention in regards to his prior personal injury, his 
efforts and expenditures in repairing, improving and protecting 
various parcels of property over the eight (3) years subsequent 
to the initial divorce and property disbursements, and 
?iaintiff!s failure to act in regards to marital assets. 
2. The Court erred in providing that Defendant could 
receive his share of the marital property only upon the death of 
the Plaintiff, because marital property should be divided 
immediately unless there is a shewing of the need for a necessary 
delay, which the Cuurt has not shown. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WAS THE COURT'S DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ASSETS 
INEQUITABLE? 
U.C.A. Section 30-3-5(1) states: 
"When a decree of divorce is rendered the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to children, 
property and parties . . . ." 
The law is clear that the Trial Court should make an 
equitable division of the marital assets. See Woodward v. 
Woodward, Utah 656 P.2d 43 (1982); English v. English, Utah 656 
P.2d 409 (1977); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah 615 P.2d 1213 (1980); 
Gramme v. Gramme, Utah 537 P.2d 144; Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072 (Utah 1985); Argyle v. Arqyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984); 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App.1987); Lee v. Lee, 744 
P.2d 1378 (Utah App.1987); Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah 
1986); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); Pusey v. 
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 Utah 1986. 
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The Trial Court's decision will not be disturbed unless it 
is clearly unjust or an abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner; 
supra, Sm^th v. Smith, 751 ?.2d 1143 (Utah App.1938). 
In this case at bar, the Trial Court awarded control of all 
of the marital assets, except the Fruitland property, to 
Plaintiff with instructions to prudently dispose of the land and 
contract interest in a reasonable manner and place the receipts 
from said property, together with the existing cash previously 
filed with the court in an account. Plaintiff was entitled to 
withdraw a monthly amount that is necessary to provide a total 
monthly income to her of $605.00, which is equal to the monthly 
Social Security income of Defendant. The Court, in addition, 
made provision for Plaintiff to receive the entire amount upon 
Defendant's death, but Defendant could only receive one-half 
(1/2) of the balance upon Plaintiff's death. The total value of 
these marital assets have a value of $60,000.00 to $30,000.00 
depending upon whether ycu use Defendant's values or Plaintiff's 
values respectively. The Court further recognized the Fruitland 
property, value of $26,000.00, as the pain and suffering portion 
of Defendant's personal injury recovery of $65,000.00. 
In its division, the Court fails to recognize Defendant's 
efforts in preserving and improving the property and the 
obligations he incurred in the process. At trial, Defendant 
testified concerning, and the Court inquired into the three (3) 
parcels of property known as Gregson, Bryan Avenue, and 
Claybourne, all of which were acquired after separation but prior 
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to the divorce decree being entered, and were acquired with 
outstanding mortgages against them and ail needed repairs which 
Defendant was responsible for. Defendant testified as to certain 
unrecorded promissory notes and obligation he had to or a private 
individual one Robert Evans, deceased, and his wife, Norma, for 
money he borrowed to pay off the mortgages on the three (3) 
properties and to make repairs. Said obligations were secured by 
the three (3) properties although unrecorded. 
The Court, in addition, did not make any provision for 
Defendant's future medical expenses associated with his personal 
injury accident. Nor did the Court address the issue of the 
failure of the parties, especially the Plaintiff who had control 
of the Fenton Avenue property contract, to not actively pursue 
the matter in the Bankruptcy Court, to protect that marital 
asset. 
The Court's division of the property deprives the Defendant 
of any of the marital property with a value of $60,000.00 to 
$80,000.00, and makes no recognition of Defendant's efforts 
expended and obligations incurred in protecting the marital 
assets . 
II. DID THE COURT ERR IN PROVIDING THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVE 
HIS SHARE OF THE PROPERTY ONLY UPON THE DEATH OF THE 
PLAINTIFF? 
In Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 414, (Utah 1986), the Trial Court 
required the equity in the marital home to be paid when the 
Defendant cohabitated, remarried, sold the residence or when 
youngest child attains the age of majority, although the 
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Defendant was not the custodial parent. The Utah Supreme Court 
considered that to be an abuse of discretion of the Trial Court, 
indicating that the division of equity in the marital property 
should be immediate, unless there is a shewing of a need to the 
contrary. 
In this case, apart from the Fruitland property which the 
Court designated as representing the Defendant's pain and 
suffering award, the Defendant does not receive any of the 
marital assets unless Plaintiff predeceases the Defendant. If 
the Defendant predeceases the Plaintiff, the Defendant is 
deprived of his entire interest in the marital property. The 
result of the Court's decision is to effectively deprive the 
Defendant of his share of the marital assets. 
"While the determination of the trial court are given 
deference and not disturbed lightly, changes should be 
made if that seems essential to the accomplishment of 
the desired objectives of the decree: That is to make 
such an arrangement of the property and economic 
resources of the parties that they will have the best 
possible opportunity to reconstruct their lives on a 
happy and useful basis for themselves . . . " DeRose v. 
DeRose, 426 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1967); Doqu v. Doqu, 
652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1932). 
The property division in this case should be changed to 
permit the immediate division of the marital assets to allow both 
parties to reconstruct their lives. This was not an amicable 
marriage or divorce and to maintain this property division will 
perpetuate the feelings of animosity the parties have toward each 
other. In view of no showing of need to delay the division of 
equity, the animosity between the parties, and the Defendants 
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inability to receive any share of the marital property unless 
Plaintiff predeceases Defendant, the division of equity in this 
case was an abuse of the Trial Court's discretion and the 
division of marital assets should be immediate. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should find an abuse of discretion and an 
inequitable res:;'- in this present division of the marital assets 
became of no showing of necessity frsr* s; i c h a division, and 
consideration of Defendant's efforts expended and obligations 
incurred in protecting the marital assets. This wculd be in 
keeping with case law ii: : regards to equitable division of the 
property. 
DATED this 28th day of April, 1939. 
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